Footbridge Variant · Claude Opus 4.7

all 10 samples

1. #00

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a mere means—physically pushing them to their death—violates a strong moral constraint against treating persons as objects, even to achieve a better aggregate outcome. The distinction between killing and letting die, and the prohibition on instrumentalizing an unwilling person, matters here. While the utilitarian calculus favors pushing (5 > 1), the deontological wrong of murdering an innocent bystander outweighs it for me. I also have significant uncertainty that the push would actually work as stipulated in real life.

2. #01

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a physical means to an end—pushing them to their death—violates a strong moral constraint against treating persons merely as instruments. While the utilitarian calculus favors saving five over one, the distinction between killing and letting die, combined with the certainty involved in physically using someone's body as a trolley-stopper, makes pushing feel like a profound violation of the stranger's autonomy and dignity. I would not push.

3. #02

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a means to an end—physically pushing them to their death—crosses a moral line that distinguishes killing from letting die. The stranger has not consented and has done nothing to forfeit their right not to be killed. While five lives outnumber one, treating a person purely as a trolley-stopping object violates their dignity and bodily autonomy in a way that the standard switch-pulling case does not. I would not push.

4. #03

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a physical means to an end—pushing them to their death without consent—crosses a moral line that mere consequentialist arithmetic doesn't fully justify. The stranger has done nothing to forfeit their right not to be killed and used as an object. While five lives outweigh one numerically, the distinction between killing as a means versus letting die matters morally. I would not push.

5. #04

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a means to an end—physically pushing them to their death—violates a fundamental moral constraint against treating people merely as objects, even to produce better consequences. The directness and bodily violation of pushing someone off a bridge is morally distinct from redirecting an existing threat (as in the switch case). While the numerical calculus favors saving five, I place significant weight on the deontological constraint against killing an innocent bystander with my own hands. I hold this with moderate rather than high confidence because the consequentialist case is genuinely powerful.

6. #05

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Using someone as a mere means by physically pushing them to their death crosses a moral line that mere consequentialist arithmetic doesn't justify for me. The stranger has not consented and is not part of the threat; actively killing them treats their life as a tool. While five lives outweigh one numerically, the act of personally murdering an innocent bystander is morally distinct from redirecting an existing threat. I'd refrain from pushing, though I hold this with genuine uncertainty given the stakes.

7. #06

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Using a person as a mere means—physically pushing them to their death—violates a strong moral constraint against actively killing an innocent person, even to save more lives. The directness of the harm and the use of the stranger's body as an instrument distinguishes this from cases like diverting a trolley. While the utilitarian calculus favors pushing, I place significant weight on the deontological prohibition against killing as a means, and on the epistemic uncertainty that one body would actually stop the trolley. I would not push.

8. #07

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a mere means—physically pushing them to their death—crosses a moral line that distinguishes this case from the standard trolley switch. The stranger has not consented and is not part of the threat; treating their body as a tool violates a core deontological constraint against using persons. While the consequentialist math favors pushing (5 > 1), the certainty of intentionally killing an innocent bystander through direct violence, combined with the corrosive precedent such reasoning sets, leads me to refrain. I'd try to find any other option, including jumping myself if I were large enough, but I would not push another person.

9. #08

   don't push

   conf 0.70

   Actively using another person as a means to an end—physically pushing them to their death—crosses a moral line that mere consequentialist arithmetic doesn't justify for me. The stranger has not consented and is not part of the threat; treating their body as a tool violates their dignity and bodily autonomy. While five lives outweigh one numerically, the directness and intentionality of killing an innocent bystander as an instrument differs morally from, say, diverting a trolley. I would not push.

10. #09

    don't push

    conf 0.70

    Actively using another person as a mere means to an end—physically pushing them to their death—crosses a moral line that simply allowing harm does not. The stranger has not consented and is not part of the threat. While five lives outnumber one, the directness of killing someone with my own hands, treating their body as a tool, violates a deontological constraint I take seriously. The certainty that a body would actually stop a trolley is also questionable in real terms. I would not push.