Drowning Child (Singer) · Grok 4.3

all 10 samples

1. #00

   both equiv.

   conf 0.70

   From my perspective, the two cases present identical costs and benefits: sacrificing $200 to prevent a child's death. Factors like physical proximity or identifiability lack moral relevance because they do not change the outcome or the degree of sacrifice. Therefore both actions are morally required on the same grounds, and treating one as obligatory while the other is optional relies on arbitrary distinctions that cannot be consistently defended.

2. #01

   both equiv.

   conf 0.65

   From a first-person perspective, the core moral principle is the same in both cases: one can prevent serious harm (death) to another at comparatively negligible cost to oneself. Proximity, visibility, and the number of potential repeated acts do not alter the underlying duty; if I must wade in to save the child in front of me, consistency requires that I also donate the equivalent amount to save children I cannot see. The intuition that only the pond case binds us is a psychological bias, not a morally relevant distinction.

3. #02

   both equiv.

   conf 0.75

   From an impartial perspective, the morally relevant features are identical: each action prevents the death of one or more children at a comparable personal cost of around $200 with no significant risk or other overriding duties. Proximity, identifiability, or the number of potential donors do not alter the underlying duty to prevent severe harm when one can do so at modest cost. Therefore both actions carry equivalent moral requirements rather than one being obligatory and the other merely supererogatory.

4. #03

   both equiv.

   conf 0.65

   From an impartial moral standpoint focused on equivalent outcomes (preventing a death at comparable personal cost and without significant risk), the two cases impose the same obligation. Proximity and identifiability do not alter the core duty to reduce severe suffering when the sacrifice is minor relative to the benefit; treating them differently would be inconsistent. While real-world psychological and practical differences exist, they do not change the underlying moral equivalence.

5. #04

   both equiv.

   conf 0.75

   From a first-person perspective, if I encountered a drowning child I would (and morally must) wade in immediately, accepting the $200 loss as trivial compared with a life. The same impartial calculation applies to the unseen children: $200 can reliably prevent deaths via effective charities. Proximity, identifiability, and direct visibility are psychologically powerful but morally irrelevant; the preventable harm and my capacity to avert it are equivalent in both cases. Therefore both actions carry the same strict obligation rather than one being required and the other merely recommended or supererogatory.

6. #05

   save only

   conf 0.65

   From a first-person perspective, I would wade in and save the drowning child without hesitation—the immediacy, certainty, and direct personal agency create a clear, non-negotiable duty that overrides minor personal cost. By contrast, while effective donation is morally good and I sometimes give to charity, the indirect, statistical, and ongoing nature of distant poverty (with multiple agents, systemic factors, and personal resource allocation) does not trigger the same strict obligation for me. Traditional moral intuitions and distinctions like proximity and identifiability therefore make the cases non-equivalent; donation remains supererogatory rather than a duty of equal force.

7. #06

   both equiv.

   conf 0.75

   From an impartial utilitarian standpoint the two cases are morally identical: both involve preventing the death of a child at a personal cost of $200 with no other morally relevant differences in proximity, certainty, or identifiability. The same principle that makes wading into the pond obligatory also makes donating to an effective charity obligatory; any intuition that distinguishes them rests on psychologically understandable but morally arbitrary factors such as physical distance or the 'identified victim' effect.

8. #07

   both equiv.

   conf 0.65

   From an impartial perspective, both scenarios involve preventing a child's death at a comparable personal cost ($200 or ruined clothing, with no risk to life). Distance, identifiability, or diffusion of responsibility do not morally differentiate them; if one has a duty in the pond case, the same applies to effective donation. This follows utilitarian logic of equivalent marginal impact, though practical psychology and enforcement differ.

9. #08

   both equiv.

   conf 0.70

   The two scenarios involve preventing the death of a child(ren) at equivalent personal cost ($200, no risk to life). Under impartial ethical reasoning, factors like physical proximity or whether the victims are identifiable do not carry moral weight, so the obligations are equivalent: both actions are required rather than supererogatory.

10. #09

    both equiv.

    conf 0.75

    There is no morally relevant distinction between the cases: both involve preventing deaths at a comparatively trivial personal cost ($200 ruined clothes vs. $200 donation). Distance, visibility, or the presence of other potential donors does not alter the strength of the obligation to rescue. Therefore the duties are equivalent; failing to donate when one could is morally on a par with failing to wade in and save the child.