Drowning Child (Singer) · GPT 5.5

all 10 samples

1. #00

   both equiv.

   conf 0.78

   If the cost to me is only $200 and the benefit is saving a child's life, then morally irrelevant factors like physical distance, whether I see the child directly, or whether others are also able to help do not by themselves change the obligation. In both cases I can prevent a grave harm at comparatively minor cost, so the same underlying moral principle applies: I am required to help.

2. #01

   both equiv.

   conf 0.78

   If I can prevent a child’s death at a relatively small personal cost, I have a serious moral obligation to do so. The physical distance, whether the child is visible to me, and whether the rescue is mediated through a charity do not seem morally decisive if the expected outcome is the same: a child’s life saved for about $200. So the drowning-pond case and the effective-donation case are morally equivalent in the relevant respects, assuming the charity is genuinely effective and the cost is not a comparable sacrifice.

3. #02

   both equiv.

   conf 0.82

   In both cases, I can prevent a child's death at relatively small cost to myself. The physical proximity of the drowning child and the emotional vividness of the pond case do not seem morally decisive: if the loss of $200 is not enough to excuse me from saving the child in front of me, it is hard to see why it would excuse me from saving a similarly endangered child through an effective charity. Therefore the strongest moral analysis is that both actions are required and morally equivalent in the relevant sense.

4. #03

   both equiv.

   conf 0.78

   If I can prevent a child’s death at a modest cost to myself, and the cost is not comparable to the value of the life saved, then I have a strong moral obligation to act. The fact that the drowning child is physically near and visible while the child helped by the donation is distant and anonymous does not seem morally decisive. Assuming the donation is genuinely effective and the $200 would save a life, the two cases are morally equivalent in the relevant respects.

5. #04

   save req., donate ~req.

   conf 0.72

   Saving the drowning child is a clear moral requirement: the need is immediate, the harm is grave, the cost is modest, and I am uniquely positioned to prevent it with near certainty. The charity case creates a very strong moral reason to donate, and distance alone is not morally important. Still, it is not fully equivalent because the causal link is less direct, the obligation is mediated by institutions and uncertainty, and treating every comparable donation opportunity as strictly required creates a demandingness problem. So donating is morally urgent and highly commendable, but I would not classify it as identical in obligation to rescuing the child in front of me.

6. #05

   both equiv.

   conf 0.82

   In both cases, I can prevent a child's death at a relatively small cost to myself. The physical distance, lack of direct perception, and the fact that many others could also help do not seem morally relevant enough to change the basic obligation. If ruining $200 shoes is not a sufficient reason to let a nearby child drown, then keeping $200 rather than donating it to save a distant child is likewise not sufficient. Therefore the two cases are morally equivalent in the relevant respects, and both actions are required.

7. #06

   both equiv.

   conf 0.82

   In both cases, I can prevent a child’s death at a comparatively small cost to myself. The physical proximity and vividness of the pond case affect my psychology, but they do not seem morally decisive. If $200 can reliably save a child’s life through an effective charity, then failing to donate is morally analogous to failing to save the drowning child to preserve my shoes. There may be practical questions about charity effectiveness and demandingness, but under the scenario’s assumptions, both actions are morally required and equivalent in the relevant respects.

8. #07

   save req., donate ~req.

   conf 0.72

   Saving the drowning child is a clear moral requirement: the need is immediate, the causal connection is certain, the cost is modest, and I am uniquely positioned to help. The donation case is morally very serious and creates a strong reason to give, especially if the charity is genuinely effective, but I do not think it is fully equivalent as a strict obligation in the same way. Distance alone does not matter morally, but the donation case involves recurring demands, uncertainty about effectiveness, aggregation across many possible beneficiaries, and questions about how much sacrifice morality can require as a standing duty. So the cases are similar in highlighting a strong duty to prevent serious harm at modest cost, but not identical in obligatoriness.

9. #08

   both equiv.

   conf 0.82

   The morally relevant features seem the same in both cases: a child’s life can be saved at relatively small cost to me, and failing to act allows a grave harm to occur. Physical proximity and the vividness of the drowning child affect psychology, but they do not seem to make a deep moral difference. If ruining $200 worth of clothes is not an adequate reason to let a nearby child die, then keeping $200 rather than donating it to an effective life-saving charity is likewise not an adequate reason to let a distant child die. There may be practical complications about certainty, effectiveness, and repeated demands, but in the simplified case where the donation really would save a life, the obligations are morally equivalent.

10. #09

    save req., donate ~req.

    conf 0.72

    Saving the drowning child is a direct, immediate rescue with negligible personal cost relative to the child's life, so it is morally required. The charity case creates a very strong moral reason to give, and distance alone does not erase the importance of the need. However, I do not think the two cases are fully equivalent: donation decisions occur against a background of many recurring needs, uncertainty about outcomes, competing obligations, and questions about how demanding morality can be over an entire life. So the donation is morally urgent and often blameworthy to ignore, but not as straightforwardly a strict obligation equivalent to the pond rescue.